This past Monday, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner trotted out his latest version of a bank rescue package. The markets liked it, gaining almost seven percent on the news. After a brief respite of profit-taking on Tuesday, the markets resumed their climb on Wednesday, adding another two percent over the next two days. Although the markets traded lower on Friday, the earlier action helped both the Dow and S&P to their best month so far this year.
Back in February, when Geithner originally unveiled his plan, the markets had the opposite reaction, plunging on the news. In this article, we will examine the new plan in an effort to determine the reasons for the turnaround and to ascertain whether the latest reaction is justified.Background
On February 10, when Geithner originally unveiled his bank bail-out plan, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 382 points, almost a five percent decline, while the S&P 500 Average turned in a similar performance, falling 43 points. The biggest complaint about the package at the time concerned its lack of detail, specifically about how "toxic assets" would be valued.
Toxic assets, carried on the books of the nation’s largest banks, were creating a drain on capital. These were asset-backed securities (mostly backed by non-performing mortgages) or other non-performing loans. The banks had no way to accurately value these assets because they were essentially illiquid. They weren’t being traded. Because of accounting rules requiring the banks to "mark these assets to the market" - assigning current values to the assets (which were in most cases significantly lower than their values at the time of acquisition) - the banks were forced to either come up with more capital or face the possibility of bankruptcy.
Former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson attempted to tackle the problem in October with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Initially he planned to buy the so-called toxic assets, but ultimately wound up simply throwing capital at the banks.Geithner’s plan had originally been extensively hyped by the Obama Administration as part of the Administration’s master plan that would eventually pull the nation out of its deepest recession since the 1930s. But when the Geithner’s product disappointed its advance billing, the markets reacted accordingly.
This week Geithner filled in some of the blanks and the market liked what it heard.
The Plan
Fixing the financial system, according to the Treasury Secretary, would require a two-pronged approach: targeting both bank assets and bank capital.
Bank capital would be addressed by the "stress" tests Geithner detailed in his first announcement. Analyses of banks’ capital would be performed under various scenarios, determining whether the banks could remain solvent in all types of financial conditions. Weaker banks might receive further capital injections or might even be taken over, temporarily, by the government.The problem of the banks’ assets was the subject of Monday’s plan, called the "Public / Private Partnership Investment Program" (PPIP). The PPIP would provide a means for removing "legacy" assets from the books of the banks (there are no longer "toxic" assets; they have been renamed "legacy" assets - apparently a term more palatable to the general public).
The PPIP actually has two parts: one for legacy securities, asset-backed securities which the banks have been unable to sell, including securities that are backed by sub-prime mortgages and are no longer rated triple-A (these were not covered by previous rescue plans); and a second part which would cover whole real-estate loans carried on the books of the banks.
To handle the "legacy" securities, the government would create up to five joint ventures, between the government and private investor groups. The private group would be responsible for raising private equity capital. The government would provide one dollar of equity capital and up to one dollar of Treasury loans for each dollar of private equity capital raised. The partnerships would then go out and bid for assets. Government financing would be provided on a non-recourse basis. Banks would hopefully be willing to sell their assets at auction but would have the last word on whether they would actually sell those assets. Prices of the assets would be set by the auctions and would essentially be dictated by the private investors.
For the problem loans, banks would be encouraged to offer pools of problem loans for auction. Authorized investors would pre-qualify for dollar-for-dollar government equity and up to twelve times their equity stake in FDIC-guaranteed loans.
The plan is extremely attractive for private investors. As Bill Gross, founder of Pimco, a bond fund manager, put it, "This is perhaps the first win/win/win policy to be put on the table and it should be welcomed enthusiastically." In the case of the legacy securities (formerly known as toxic securities), the private partnerships will be able to leverage their capital by a factor of three and purchase assets at possibly very low prices. Because of the government equity contribution and non-recourse government financing, they have an opportunity to make some extraordinary profits while the government takes on most of the risk. In the case of problem loans, the private investors could achieve 12-to-1 leverage, again with little risk.Pricing Problems
One of the questions surrounding the initial announcement of a rescue package was how the assets would be priced. The Treasury hopes this will be answered by the auction system the government would be setting up. But this system has itself a number of problems.
With regard to legacy securities, the banks will have to take a write-off against capital for any losses incurred in the sale of these assets. Consequently, the banks are going to be in no rush to sell these assets, especially at fire-sale prices. (Plans by the SEC to remove the mark-to-market requirement, currently underway, will make it even less likely that banks will be willing to unload these assets.) So they will try to hold out for the best possible price they can get.
Private investors, knowing that the federal government will bear most of the risk of loss in acquisition of these securities, would be more willing to pay higher prices for these securities than if they were being forced to shoulder the risk themselves.We believe the government will wind up financing (and partially owning) securities that carry a greater risk of loss than if the securities had been offered in a pure auction (one where the buyers were not backstopped by the government).
Other Problems
As Bill Gross said, the policy appears to be a win/win/win situation, but mostly for the private investors. It will probably solve the toxic asset problem. Most profits will go to the private investors. If losses are incurred, however, they will be borne by the taxpayers. The government runs the risk of a creating a program that will be viewed by the general public as another scheme for the "fat cats" on Wall Street to get rich at the expense of the little guys on Main Street. That’s not what Wall Street needs at this time, nor does the government need this.
A second problem that has been raised by a number of observers is the problem of bank recapitalization. Banks, according to these observers, need a lot more capital. The only way this capital can be raised, they argue is through debt-for-equity swaps, either with the government or with private investors. Should the government be involved this would mean the possibility of some type of nationalization, probably of a temporary nature.
A final problem that has been raised is the fact that the program does not address the real problem in the system - the need for restructuring. In the 1990s, the Japanese financial system was faced with similar problems regarding bad loans. The Japanese government tried to paper over the problem by feeding capital to the banks and keeping bad banks afloat. However, the problems were not really solved until the government allowed a number of the "bad" banks to go under. Many observers believe the same medicine is needed for the US financial system, that no bank is "too big to fail."
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